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Abstract
In this paper, we will sketch the basic system of Justification Logic, which is a general
logical framework for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic renders a new,
evidence-based foundation for epistemic logic. As a case study, we compare formalizations of
the Kripke ‘Red Barn’ scenario in modal epistemic logic and Justification Logic and show here
that the latter provides a deeper analysis. In particular, we argue that modal language fails to
fully represent the epistemic closure principle whereas Justification Logic provides its adequate
formalization.
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Introduction

Since Plato, the notion of justification has been an essential component of epistemic studies (cf. [15;
22; 24; 26; 36; 42; 48], and many others). However, until recently, the notion of justification
was conspicuously absent in the mathematical models of knowledge within the epistemic logic
framework. Commencing from seminal works [28; 52], the notions of Knowledge and Belief have
acquired formalization by means of modal logic with atoms F is known and F is believed. Within
this approach, the following analysis was adopted: For a given agent,
F is known

∼

F holds in all epistemically possible situations.

The deficiency of this approach is displayed most prominently, in the Logical Omniscience feature
of the modal logic of knowledge (cf. [17; 18; 29; 41; 44]). This lack of a justification component has,
perhaps, contributed to a certain gap between epistemic logic and mainstream epistemology ([26;
27]). We would like to think that Justification Logic is a step towards filling this void.
∗
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Justification Logic had been anticipated in [23] (as the logic of explicit mathematical proofs)
and in [51] (in epistemology), developed in [2; 3; 34; 40] and other papers (as the Logic of Proofs),
and then in [4; 5; 6; 8; 12; 20; 21; 25; 31; 33; 43; 45; 47; 53] and other papers in a broader
epistemic context. It introduces a long-anticipated mathematical notion of justification, making
epistemic logic more expressive. We now have the capacity to reason about justifications, simple
and compound. We can compare different pieces of evidence pertaining to the same fact. We can
measure the complexity of justifications, which leads to a coherent theory of logical omniscience [7].
Justification Logic provides a novel, evidence-based mechanism of evidence-tracking which seems
to be a key ingredient of the analysis of knowledge. Finally, Justification Logic furnishes a new,
evidence-based foundation for the logic of knowledge, according to which
F is known

∼

F has an adequate justification.

Justification assertions have the format t:F , which is read generically as
t is a justification of F.
There is also a more strict ‘justificationist’ reading in which t:F is understood as
t is accepted by agent as a justification of F.
Justification Logic is general enough to incorporate other semantics; e.g., the topological semantics
of Justification Logic has been studied in [9].
Justification Logic has been built so far on the simplest base: classical Boolean logic, and it is
a natural next step to extend these ideas to more elaborate logical models, e.g., intuitionistic and
substructural logics, conditionals, relevance logics, and logics of counterfactual reasoning. There
are several good reasons for choosing a Boolean logic base for our first meaningful step. At this
stage, we are concerned first with justifications, which provide a sufficiently serious challenge on
even the simplest Boolean base. Once this case is sorted out in a satisfactory way, we can move on
to incorporating justifications into other logics. Second, Boolean-based Justification Logic seems to
cover known paradigmatic examples, e.g., Russell’s and Gettier’s examples ([5]) and Kripke’s Red
Barn Example, which we consider below.
Within the Justification Logic framework, we treat both – justifications, which do not necessarily yield the truth of a belief, and factive justifications, which yield the truth of the belief. This
helps to capture the essence of discussion about these matters in epistemology, where justifications
are not generally assumed to be factive.
In this paper, we consider the case of one agent only, although multi-agent Justification Logics
have already been studied ([4; 8; 53]).
Formal logical methods do not directly solve philosophical problems but rather provide a tool for
analyzing assumptions and ensuring that we draw correct conclusions. Our hope is that Justification
Logic does just that.

2

Justifications and Operations

In order to build a formal account of justification, we will make some basic structural assumptions:
justifications are abstract objects which have structure, agents do not lose or forget justifications,
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agents apply the laws of classical logic and accept their conclusions, etc.
We assume two basic operations on justifications, Application ‘·’ and Sum ‘+,’ both having clear
epistemic meaning and exact interpretations in relevant mathematical models.
The Application operation ‘·’ performs one epistemic action, a one-step deduction according
to the Modus Ponens rule. Application takes a justification s of an implication F → G and a
justification t of its antecedent, F , and produces a justification s·t of the succedent, G. Symbolically,
s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s·t):G).

(1)

This is a basic property of justification-type objects assumed in combinatory logic and λ-calculi
(cf. [49]), Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics ([50]), Kleene realizability ([30]), the Logic of
Proofs LP ([3]), etc. Application principle (1) is related to the epistemic closure principle (cf., for
example, [37])
one knows everything that one knows to be implied by what one knows.

(2)

However, (1) does not rely on (2), since (1) deals with a broader spectrum of justifications not
necessarily linked to knowledge. If justifications s and t are formal Hilbert-style proofs, then s·t
can be understood as a new proof obtained from s and t by a single application of the rule Modus
Ponens to all possible premises F → G from s, and F from t:
s·t = s ∗ t ∗ !G1 " ∗ . . . ∗ !Gn ",
where ∗ is concatenation, !X" denotes the Gödel number of X, and Gi ’s are all formulas from t
for which there is a formula F → Gi from s.
The second basic operation Sum ‘+’ expresses the idea of pooling evidence together without
performing any epistemic action. Operation ‘+’ takes justifications s and t and produces s + t,
which is a justification for everything justified by s or by t.
s:F → (s + t):F

and

s:F → (t + s):F.

In the context of formal proofs, the sum ‘s + t’ can be interpreted as a concatenation of proofs s
and t
s + t = s ∗ t.

Such an operation is needed to connect Justification Logic with epistemic modal logic. Justification Logic systems without ‘+’ have been studied in [10; 32; 33].
Justification terms (polynomials) are built from justification variables x, y, z, . . . and justification
constants a, b, c, . . . by means of the operations ‘·’ and ‘+.’ Constants denote atomic justifications
which the system no longer analyzes; variables denote unspecified justifications. For the sake of
technical convenience, we assume that each constant comes with indices i = 1, 2, 3 . . . which we will
omit whenever it is safe.
More elaborate Justification Logic systems use additional operations on justifications, e.g.,
verifier ‘!’ and negative verifier ‘?’ ([3; 5; 43; 46; 47]), but we will not need them in this paper.
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Basic Logic of Justifications

Formulas are built from propositional atoms as the usual formulas of Boolean logic, e.g., by means
of logical connectives ∧, ∨,→, ¬ with the additional formation rule:
Whenever t is a justification term and F is a formula, t:F is again a formula.
The basic Logic of Justifications J0 contain the following postulates:
A1. Classical propositional axioms and rule Modus Ponens,
A2. Application Axiom s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s·t):G),
A3. Sum Axiom s:F → (s+t):F , s:F → (t+s):F .
J0 is the logic of general (not necessarily factive) justifications for an absolutely skeptical agent
for whom no formula is provably justified, i.e., J0 does not derive t:F for any t and F . Such an
agent is, however, capable of making relative justification conclusions of the form
if x:A, y:B, . . . , z:C hold, then t:F .
J0 is able, with this capacity, to adequately emulate other Justification Logic systems within its
language.
Well-known examples of epistemic reasoning reveal that logical axioms are often assumed justified. Justification Logic offers a flexible mechanism of Constant Specifications that represents
different shades of this kind of logical awareness.
Justification Logic distinguishes between assumptions and justified assumptions. Constants are
used to denote justifications of assumptions in situations where we don’t analyze these justifications
further. Suppose we want to postulate that an axiom A is justified for a given agent. The way to
state it in Justification Logic is to postulate
e1:A
for some justification constant e1 with index 1. Furthermore, if we want to postulate that this new
principle e1:A is also justified, we can postulate
e2:(e1:A)
for the similar constant e2 with index 2, then
e3:(e2:(e1:A)),
etc. Using similar constants for ‘in-depth justifications’ and keeping track of indices is not really
necessary, but it is easy and helps in decision procedures (cf. [35]). By en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A, we mean
en : (en−1 : . . . : (e1 : A) . . .). A set of assumptions of this kind for a given logic is called a Constant
Specification. Here is a formal definition.
4

A Constant Specification CS for a given logic L is a set of formulas
en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A (n ≥ 1),
in which A is an axiom of L, and e1 , e2 , . . . , en are similar constants with indices 1, 2, . . . , n. We
also assume that CS contains all intermediate specifications, i.e., whenever en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A is in
CS, then en−1 : . . . : e1 : A is in CS, too. Here are typical examples of constant specifications:
• empty: CS = ∅. This corresponds to an absolutely skeptical agent (cf. a comment after
axioms of J0 ).
• finite: CS is a finite set of formulas. This is a representative case, since any specific derivation
in Justification Logic concerns only finite sets of constants and constant specifications.
• axiomatically appropriate: For each axiom A, there is a constant e1 such that e1:A is in CS,
and if en : . . . : e1 : A ∈ CS, then en+1 : en : . . . : e1 : A ∈ CS.
• total: For each axiom A and any constants e1 , e2 , . . . , en ,
en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A ∈ CS.
Naturally, the total constant specification is axiomatically appropriate.
Logic of Justifications with given Constant Specification
JCS = J0 + CS.

Logic of Justifications
J = J0 + R4,
where R4 is the Axiom Internalization Rule:
For each axiom A and any constants e1 , e2 , . . . , en , infer en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A.
Note that J0 is J∅ , and J is JCS with the total Constant Specification CS. The latter reflects the
idea of the unrestricted logical awareness for J. A similar principle appeared in the Logic of Proofs
LP.
For each constant specification CS, JCS enjoys the Deduction Theorem because J0 contains
propositional axioms and Modus Ponens as the only rule of inference.
Logical awareness expressed by axiomatically appropriate constant specifications ensures an
important Internalization Property of the system. This property was anticipated by Gödel in [23]
for the logic of explicit mathematical proofs, and was first established for the Logic of Proofs LP in [2;
3].
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Theorem 1 For each axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS, JCS enjoys the Internalization Property:
If ) F , then ) p:F for some justification term p.
Proof. Induction on derivation length. If F is an axiom A, then, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant e1 such that e1 :A is in CS, hence an axiom of JCS . If F is in CS,
then, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, en :F is in CS for some constant en . If F is obtained
by Modus Ponens from X → F and X, then, by the Induction Hypothesis, ) s:(X → F ) and ) t:X
for some s, t. By the Application Axiom, ) (s·t):F .
!
Internalization in J is an explicit incarnation of the Necessitation Rule in modal logic K:
)F

⇒ ) !F.

Let us consider some basic examples of derivations in J. In Examples 1 and 2, only constants
of level 1 have been used; in such situations we skip indices completely.
Example 1 This example shows how to build a justification of a conjunction from justifications
of the conjuncts. In the traditional modal language, this principle is formalized as
!A ∧ !B → !(A ∧ B).
In J we express this idea in a more precise justification language.
1. A → (B → A∧B), a propositional axiom;
2. c:[A → (B → A∧B)], from 1, by R4;
3. x:A → (c·x):(B → A∧B), from 2, by A2 and Modus Ponens;
4. x:A → (y:B → ((c·x)·y):(A∧B)), from 3, by A2 and some propositional reasoning;
5. x:A∧y:B → ((c·x)·y):(A∧B), from 5, by propositional reasoning.
Derived formula 5 contains constant c, which was introduced in line 2, and the complete reading
of the result of this derivation is
x:A∧y:B → ((c·x)·y):(A∧B), given c:[A → (B → A∧B)].
Example 2 This example shows how to build a justification of a disjunction from justifications of
either disjuncts. In the usual modal language, this is represented by
!A ∨ !B → !(A ∨ B).
Let us see how this would look in J.
1. A → A∨B, by A1;
2. a:[A → A∨B], from 1, by R4;
3. x:A → (a·x):(A∨B), from 2, by A2 and Modus Ponens;
4. B → A∨B, by A1;
5. b:[B → A∨B], from 4, by R4;
6

6.
7.
8.
9.

y:B → (b·y):(A∨B) from 5, by A2 and Modus Ponens;
(a·x):(A∨B) → (a·x+b·y):(A∨B), by A3;
(b·y):(A∨B) → (a·x+b·y):(A∨B), by A3;
(x:A∨y:B) → (a·x+b·y):(A∨B) from 3, 6, 7, 8, by propositional reasoning.

The complete reading of the result of this derivation is

(x:A∨y:B) → (a·x+b·y):(A∨B), given a:[A → A∨B] and b:[B → A∨B].
These examples, perhaps, leave the (correct) impression that J can emulate derivations in the
corresponding modal logic; here it is K, but at the expense of keeping track of specific justifications.
A need for such additional bureaucracy requires explanation and illustration, which is the main
goal of this paper. Before we proceed to Section 4, in which such an example is provided, we briefly
list applications of Justification Logic so far:
• intended provability semantics for Gödel’s provability logic S4 with the Completeness Theorem
([2; 3]);
• formalization of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic
with the Completeness Theorem ([2; 3]);
• a general definition of the Logical Omniscience property and theorems that evidence assertions
in Justification Logic are not logically omniscient ([7]);
• an evidence-based approach to Common Knowledge (so-called Justified Common Knowledge)
which provides a rigorous epistemic semantics to McCarthy’s ‘any fool knows’ systems ([1; 4;
38]). Justified Common Knowledge offers formal systems which are less restrictive than the
usual epistemic logics with Common Knowledge [4];
• formalization of Gettier examples in Justification Logic with missing assumptions and redundancy analysis [5], which demonstrates that Justification Logic methods can be applied in
formal epistemology;
• analysis of Knower and Knowability paradoxes ([13; 14]).
The Correspodence Theorem ([2; 3; 5; 11; 47]) is a cumulative result stating that for each
of major epistemic modal logics K, T, K4, S4, K45, KD45, S5, there is a system of justification
terms and a corresponding Justification Logic system (called J, JT, J4, LP, J45, JD45, and JT45)
capable of recovering explicit justifications for modalities in any theorem of the original modal logic.
This theorem is proven by a variety of methods ranging from cut-elimination in modal logics to
semantical proof using Kripke-Fitting models (cf. Section 5).
Complexity issues in Justification Logic have been addressed in [12; 31; 33; 34; 35; 39].
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Red Barn Example and Tracking Justifications

We illustrate new capabilities of Justification Logic on a paradigmatic Red Barn Example which
Kripke developed in 1980 (cf. [37], from which we borrow the formulation, with some editing for
brevity).
Suppose I am driving through a neighborhood in which, unbeknownst to me, papiermâché barns are scattered, and I see that the object in front of me is a barn. Because
I have barn-before-me percepts, I believe that the object in front of me is a barn. Our
intuitions suggest that I fail to know barn. But now suppose that the neighborhood
has no fake red barns, and I also notice that the object in front of me is red, so I know
a red barn is there. This juxtaposition, being a red barn, which I know, entails there
being a barn, which I do not, “is an embarrassment”1 .
We consider the Red Barn Example a test for theories that explain knowledge. From such a theory,
we expect a way to represent what is happening here which maintains epistemic closure principle
(2), but also preserves the epistemic structure of the example.
We present formal analysis of the Red Barn Example in epistemic modal logic (subsections 4.1
and 4.2) and in Justification Logic (subsections 4.3 and 4.4). We will show that epistemic modal
logic only indicates that there is a problem, whereas Justification Logic provides resolution.
To make our point, we don’t need to formally capture every single detail of the Red Barn story;
it suffices to formalize and verify its “entailment” portion. Let
• B be the sentence ‘the object in front of me is a barn,’
• R be the sentence ‘the object in front of me is red.’

4.1

Red Barn in Modal Logic of Belief

In our first formalization, logical derivation will be performed in epistemic modal logic with ‘my
belief’ modality !. We then externally interpret some of the occurrences of ! as ‘knowledge’
according to the problem’s description. In the setting with belief modality !, episitemic closure
principle (2) seems to yield
if !F and !(F → G) are both cases of knowledge, then !G is also knowledge.

(3)

The following is a set of natural formal assumptions of the Red Barn Example in the language
of epistemic modal logic of belief:
1. !B, ‘I believe that the object in front of me is a barn’;
2. !(B∧R), ‘I believe that the object in front of me is a red barn.’ At the metalevel, we assume
that 2 is knowledge, whereas 1 is not knowledge by the problem’s description.
In the basic modal logic of belief K (hence in other modal logics of belief), the following hold:
1

Dretske [16].
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3. B ∧R → B, as a logical axiom;
4. !(B ∧ R → B), obtaned from 3 by Necessitation. As a logical truth, this also qualifies as
knowledge.
Within this formalization, it appears that (3) is violated: line 2, !(B∧R), and line 4, !(B∧R → B)
are cases of knowledge whereas !B (line 1) is not knowledge. As we see, the modal language here
does not help to resolve this issue, but rather obscures its resolution.

4.2

Red Barn in Modal Logic of Knowledge

We will now use epistemic modal logic with ‘my knowledge’ modality K. Here is a straightforward
formalization of Red Barn Example assumptions:
1. ¬KB, ‘I do not know that the object in front of me is a barn’;
2. K(B ∧R), ‘I know that the object in front of me is a red barn.’

It is easy to see that these assumptions are inconsistent in the modal logic of knowledge. Indeed,
3. K(B ∧R → B), by Necessitation of a propositional axiom;
4. K(B ∧R) → KB, from 3, by modal logic reasoning;
5. KB, from 2 and 4, by Modus Ponens.
Lines 1 and 5 formally contradict each other.
Hence, the language of modal logic of knowledge leads to an inconsistent set of formal assumptions and does not reflect the structure of the Red Barn Example properly.

4.3

Red Barn in Justification Logic of Belief

Justification Logic seems to provide a more fine-grained analysis of the Red Barn Example. In
Justification Logic, the epistemic closure principle (2) can be naturally formulated according to
Application principle (1) as
if t:F and s:(F → G) are both cases of knowledge, then (s·t):G is also knowledge.

(4)

Note that (4) is more precise than (3). In (4), we do not claim that f (s, t):G is knowledge for any
justification f (s, t) but only for a specific f (s, t), which is s · t, whereas (3) de facto postulates a
link between premises !F , !(F → G) and the conclusion !G, regardless of how this conclusion
was obtained. This is how the ambiguous modal language fails to represent the epistemic closure
principle: one cannot claim (3) when justification behind conclusion !G is not linked to those
behind premises !F and !(F → G). This is the essence of the Red Barn example, and a peril
which Justification Logic naturally avoids by virtue of its explicit language.
We formalize the Red Barn example in J where t:F is interpreted as
‘I believe F for reason t.’
We naturally introduce individual justifications u for belief that B, and v for belief that B∧R. The
list of assumptions is
9

1. u:B, ‘u is the reason to believe that the object in front of me is a barn’;
2. v:(B ∧R), ‘v is the reason to believe that the object in front of me is a red barn.’ On the
metalevel, the description states that 2 is a case of knowledge, and not merely a belief, whereas 1
is belief which is not knowledge.
Let us try to reconstruct the reasoning of the agent in J:
3. B ∧R → B, logical axiom;
4. a:[B ∧R → B], from 3, by Axiom Internalization. This is also a case of knowledge;
5. v:(B ∧R) → (a·v):B, from 4, by Application and Modus Ponens;
6. (a·v):B, from 2 and 5, by Modus Ponens.
Closure holds! By reasoning in J, we have concluded that (a·v):B is a case of knowledge, i.e., ‘I
know B for reason a·v.’ The fact that u:B is not a case of knowledge does not spoil the closure
principle, since the latter claims knowledge specifically for (a·v):B. Hence, after observing a red
façade, I indeed know B, but this knowledge has nothing to do with 1, which remains a case of
belief rather than of knowledge, and Justification Logic formalization represents this fairly.

4.4

Red Barn in Justification Logic of Knowledge

Within this formalization, t:F is interpreted as
‘I know F for reason t.’
As in Section 4.2, we assume
1. ¬u:B, ‘u is not a sufficient reason to know that the object is a barn’;
2. v:(B ∧R), ‘v is a sufficient reason to know that the object is a red barn.’

This is a perfectly consistent set of assumptions even in the logic of factive justifications
J + Factivity Principle (t:F → F ).
As in 4.3, we can derive (a·v):B where a:[B ∧R → B], but this does not lead to a contradiction.
Claims ¬u:B and (a·v):B naturally co-exist. They refer to different justifications u and a·v of the
same fact B; one of them insufficient and the other quite sufficient for my knowledge that B.

4.5

Red Barn and Formal Epistemic Models

It appears that in 4.3 and 4.4, Justification Logic represents the structure of the Red Barn Example
in a reasonable way which was not directly captured by epistemic modal logic.
I all fairness to modal tools, we could imagine a formalization of the Red Barn Example in
a sort of bi-modal language with distinct modalities for knowledge and belief, where both claims
hold: ‘!B,’ by perceptual belief that B, and ‘KB’ for knowledge that B which is logically derived
from perceptual knowledge K(B ∧ R). However, it seems that such a resolution will, intellectually,
involve repeating Justification Logic arguments from 4.3 and 4.4 in a way that obscures, rather
than reveals, the truth. Such a bi-modal formalization would distinguish u:B from (a · v):B not
10

because they have different reasons (which reflects the true epistemic structure of the problem),
but rather because the former is labelled ‘belief’ and the latter ‘knowledge.’ But what if we need to
keep track of different unrelated reasons which are all cases of either knowledge or belief? Following
this multi-modal approach, we will likely end up with a collection of distinct modalities, each for
different reasons, as well as a mounting pile of additional assumptions concerning these modalities
– all just to avoid revealing the justification structure of a problem which can easily fit into a very
basic justification logic J with the bare minimum of epistemological assumptions.

5

Basic Epistemic Semantics

This section will provide the basics of epistemic semantics for Justification Logic, the main ideas of
which have been suggested by Fitting in [20]. The standard epistemic semantics for J (cf. [5]) has
been provided by the proper adaptation of Kripke-Fitting models [20] and Mkrtychev models [40].
A Kripke-Fitting J-model M = (W, R, E, #) is a Kripke model (W, R, #) enriched with an
admissible evidence function E such that E(t, F ) ⊆ W for any justification t and formula F .
Informally, E(t, F ) specifies the set of possible worlds where t is considered admissible evidence for
F . The intended use of E is in the truth definition for justification assertions:
u # t:F if and only if

1. F holds for all possible situations, i.e., v # F for all v such that uRv;
2. t is an admissible evidence for F at u, i.e., u ∈ E(t, F ).

An admissible evidence function E must satisfy the closure conditions with respect to operations
‘·’ and ‘+’:
• Application: E(s, F → G) ∩ E(t, F ) ⊆ E(s·t, G). This condition states that whenever s is an
admissible evidence for F → G and t is an admissible evidence for F , their ‘product,’ s·t, is
an admissible evidence for G.
• Sum: E(s, F ) ∪ E(t, F ) ⊆ E(s + t, F ). This condition guarantees that s + t is an admissible
evidence for F whenever either s is an admissible evidence for F or t is an admissible evidence
for F .
Given a model M = (W, R, E, #), the forcing relation # is extended from sentence variables to all
formulas as follows: for each u ∈ W ,

1. # respects Boolean connectives at each world (u # F ∧ G iff u # F and u # G; u # ¬F iff u .# F ,
etc.);
2. u # t:F iff u ∈ E(t, F ) and v # F for every v ∈ W with uRv.

Note that an admissible evidence function E may be regarded as a Fagin-Halpern awareness function
[19] equipped with the structure of justifications.
A model M = (W, R, E, #) respects a Constant Specification CS at u ∈ W if u ∈ E(c, A) for all
formulas c:A from CS. Furthermore, M = (W, R, E, #) respects a Constant Specification CS if M
respects CS at each u ∈ W .
11

Theorem 2 For any Constant Specification CS, JCS is sound and complete for the class of all
Kripke-Fitting models respecting CS.
Mkrtychev semantics is a predecessor of Kripke-Fitting semantics ([40]). Mkrtychev models are
Kripke-Fitting models with a single world, and the proof of Theorem 2 can be easily modified to
establish completeness of JCS with respect to Mkrtychev models.
Theorem 3 For any Constant Specification CS, JCS is sound and complete for the class of Mkrtychev models respecting CS.
Theorem 3 shows that the information about Kripke structure in Kripke-Fitting models can
be completely encoded by the admissible evidence function. Mkrtychev models play an important
theoretical role in Justification Logic [12; 31; 34; 39]. On the other hand, Kripke-Fitting models can
be useful as counter-models with desirable properties since they take into account both epistemic
Kripke structure and evidence structure. Speaking metaphorically, Kripke-Fitting models naturally
reflect two reasons why a certain fact F can be unknown to an agent: F fails at some possible world
or an agent does not have a sufficient evidence of F .
Another application area of Kripke-Fitting style models is Justification Logic with both epistemic modalities and justification assertions (cf. [4; 8]).

6

Adding Factivity

Factivity states that a given justification of F is factive, i.e., sufficient for an agent to conclude that
F is true. The corresponding Factivity Axiom claims that justifications are factive:
t:F → F,

which has a similar motivation to the Truth Axiom in epistemic modal logic
KF → F,

widely accepted as a basic property of knowledge.
The Factivity Axiom first appeared in the Logic of Proofs LP as a principal feature of mathematical proofs. Indeed, in this setting Factivity is valid: if there is a mathematical proof t of F ,
then F must be true.
We adopt the Factivity Axiom for justifications that lead to knowledge. However, factivity
alone does not warrant knowledge, which has been demonstrated by Gettier examples ([22]).
Logic of Factive Justifications:
JT0 = J0 + Factivity Axiom,
JT = J + Factivity Axiom.
Systems JTCS corresponding to Constant Specifications CS are defined similarly to JCS .
JT-models are J-models with reflexive accessibility relations R. The reflexivity condition makes
each possible world accessible from itself, which exactly corresponds to the Factivity Axiom. The
direct analogue of Theorem 1 hold for JTCS as well.
12

Theorem 4 For any Constant Specification CS, each of the logics JTCS is sound and complete
with respect to the class of JT-models respecting CS.
Mkrtychev JT-models are singleton JT-models, i.e., JT-models with singleton W ’s.
Theorem 5 For any Constant Specification CS, each of the logics JTCS is sound and complete
with respect to the class of Mkrtychev JT-models respecting CS.
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Conclusions

Modal logic fails to fully represent the epistemic closure principle whereas Justification Logic
provides a more adequate formalization.
Justification Logic extends the logic of knowledge by the formal theory of justification. Justification Logic has roots in mainstream epistemology, mathematical logic, computer science, and
artificial intelligence. It is capable of formalizing a significant portion of reasoning about justifications.
It remains to be seen to what extent Justification Logic can be useful for analysis of empirical,
perceptual, and a priori types of knowledge. From the perspective of Justification Logic, such
knowledge may be considered as justified by constants (i.e., atomic justifications). Apparently,
further discussion is needed here.
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